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The Supreme Court decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014), reaffirmed the availability of the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of “reliance” for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 class 
certification. At the same time, the Court held that defendants could rebut 
the presumption if they could provide “direct evidence” that the alleged 
misrepresentations did not in fact impact the price of the security (i.e., a 
lack of price impact). In this Article we discuss various issues that have 
arisen in lower court rulings that have addressed Halliburton price impact 
arguments. These issues include the relationship between materiality and 
price impact, the distinction between hypothetical versus actual changes 
in the total mix of information made available to the market, the use of 
event studies, and some lower courts’ refusal to consider certain types of 
economic evidence in the context of price impact arguments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The showing placed on plaintiffs for obtaining class certification in a 
securities action is a matter of importance to all involved: plaintiffs, 
defendants, insurers, the legal profession, and—given the broad impact 
securities class action litigation can have—the business community as a 
whole. One of the showings plaintiffs need to make at class certification 
for claims involving Rule 10b-5—the most important anti-fraud rule in 
securities law—is that class members “relied” on the veracity of the 
alleged misrepresentations. The fraud-on-the-market presumption, adopted 
by the Supreme Court in its landmark 1988 decision Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson,
1
 enables plaintiffs to establish Rule 10b-5 “reliance” on a class-
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wide basis. The presumption that establishes class-wide “reliance” is that 
investors relied on the integrity of the security’s price, a price which is 
presumed to have been distorted by the alleged misrepresentation. With 
such a presumption in place, plaintiffs are thereby relieved of having to 
show that all class members were even aware of the alleged 
misrepresentation, much less individually “relied” on the veracity of the 
alleged misrepresentation at the time of purchase. Given its central role in 
enabling plaintiffs to obtain class certification in Rule 10b-5 matters, it is 
not surprising that the fraud-on-the-market presumption has been a 
mainstay of securities class action litigation ever since Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson was decided. 
It was therefore with much interest that the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II)
2
 
in order to consider whether Basic Inc.’s endorsement of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption should be overruled. Six Justices joined the majority 
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts reaffirming Basic Inc., with 
three Justices (Alito, Scalia, and Thomas) concurring but arguing for 
overruling Basic Inc.
3
 While reaffirming the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption, the Court did modify the traditional understanding of the 
presumption. Specifically, the Court held that if defendants can show that 
a security’s price was not in fact distorted by the alleged 
misrepresentation—that is, the alleged misrepresentation had no price 
impact—then the fraud-on-the-market presumption would be rebutted.4  
We will focus in this Article on the issue of “price impact.”5  We will 
frame our discussion by focusing on one of the most perplexing aspects of 
 
 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 3. Id. at 2417–18 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 4. Id. at 2414 (“[Defendant] contends that defendants should at least be allowed to defeat the 
presumption at the class certification stage through evidence that the misrepresentation did not in fact 
affect the stock price. We agree.”). It is worth noting that the Second Circuit had allowed defendants 
the opportunity to show a lack of price impact at class certification. In re Salomon Analyst 
Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. 
Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).  
 5. In this Article, we focus on assessing price impact at the class certification stage. Other 
papers have explored the role of event studies in assessing other elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of 
action. For example, Professor Fischel early on explored the role of event studies in assessing damages 
and loss causation. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases 
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (1982). In another paper, Bradford Cornell 
and Gregory Morgan examine the role of event studies in assessing damages prior to the Supreme 
Court’s 2005 decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). Bradford 
Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market 
Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 883–89 (1990). Moreover, Allen Ferrell and Atanu Saha examine the 
role of event studies in assessing loss causation and post-Dura recoverable damages. Allen Ferrell & 












the Court’s price impact discussion: the relationship between price impact 
arguments and arguments concerning the “materiality” of the alleged 
misrepresentations. The reason why this relationship is perplexing is that 
the Supreme Court in its Amgen decision,
6
 decided just one year prior to 
Halliburton II, held that “materiality” arguments cannot be considered at 
class certification. Specifically, the Court held that “such proof [of 
materiality] is not a prerequisite to class certification,” particularly in a 
securities fraud action based on the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
7
 So 
what is the distinction between an argument concerning the “materiality” 
of an alleged misrepresentation, which clearly cannot be considered at 
class certification under Amgen, and an argument concerning whether an 
alleged material misrepresentation impacted the security’s price, which 
clearly can be considered at class certification under Halliburton II? In 
explaining this distinction, the Halliburton II Court merely said, 
“materiality is a discrete issue that can be resolved in isolation from the 
other prerequisites” and thus “can be wholly confined to the merits 
stage. . . . Price impact is different.”8 The distinction between materiality 
and price impact arguments is an issue that the lower courts applying 
Halliburton II have grappled with. 
Another interesting and related aspect of Halliburton II’s price impact 
discussion is what type of economic evidence can be considered in 
addressing the issue of price impact at class certification? On this issue, 
the Halliburton II Court held that defendants can introduce “direct 
evidence” showing a lack of price impact,9 but did relatively little to 
identify what that evidence might consist of. This is an issue that has also 
come up in the lower court rulings applying Halliburton II. We will 
explore these related aspects of Halliburton II’s price impact discussion, 
and how they have played out in the lower courts to date, through a series 
of examples.  
Out of our discussion of Halliburton II’s price impact holding, there 
are three particularly important lessons we wish to draw. First, the 
distinction between materiality and price impact made by the Supreme 
Court in Amgen and Halliburton II might functionally represent a way of 
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sorting at class certification different types of materiality claims depending 
on their methods of proof. Second, it is difficult to justify the insistence of 
lower courts applying Halliburton II that while some disclosures, in 
addition to the actual disclosure containing the alleged misrepresentation, 
can be examined in determining whether there is price impact for class 
certification purposes, other additional disclosures cannot be so 
considered. Third, the potential conceptual importance when defining 
price impact of the distinction between actual changes in the total mix of 
information available to the market
10
 and hypothetical changes in the total 
mix of information available to the market.
11
 As we will discuss, the 
economic evidence relevant to assessing price impact can be a function of 
whether it is the price impact of actual or hypothetical changes in the total 
mix of information available to the market that is at issue.  
We will begin our discussion in Part II by examining in more detail the 
Halliburton II opinion. Part III describes the lower court opinions to date 
applying Halliburton II’s price impact framework. Part IV focuses on the 
relationship between materiality and price impact arguments from both a 
legal and economic perspective. Part V then considers assessing price 
impact (and materiality) arguments using an event study (i.e., a statistical 
analysis of whether there were firm-specific price movements on a 
particular date).  We will consider event study results and their 
relationship to the question of price impact for examples in which there are 
no statistically significant firm-specific changes in the security’s price, and 
event study results for examples in which there is a potentially important 
distinction between actual and hypothetical changes in the total mix of 
information available to the market. Finally, Part VI will conclude with 
some parting thoughts. 
II. THE HALLIBURTON II DECISION 
In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court refused to overrule Basic Inc. and 
its endorsement of the fraud-on-the market presumption, explaining:  
Halliburton urges us to overrule Basic’s presumption of reliance and 
to instead require every securities fraud plaintiff to prove that he 
actually relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation in deciding to 
 
 
 10. For example, as a result of a public statement containing a misrepresentation, which might 
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buy or sell a company’s stock. Before overturning a long-settled 
precedent, however, we require [a] “special justification,” not just 
an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided. Halliburton 
has failed to make that showing.
12
 
Rather, the Court held that plaintiffs can avail themselves of the Basic Inc. 
fraud-on-the-market presumption, and hence satisfy the requirement of 
establishing Rule 10b-5 reliance for purposes of class certification, if 
plaintiffs show: (1) the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known; 
(2) the alleged misrepresentations were material; and (3) the stock traded 
in an efficient market.
13
 The Court explained that these prerequisites 
collectively establish, albeit via indirect proof, the “fundamental premise” 
of the fraud-on-the-market presumption: that the alleged misrepresentation 
did in fact have an impact on the security’s market price.14 With such a 
showing, the “fundamental premise” of Basic Inc. is presumed to be 
satisfied, thus entitling plaintiffs to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of “reliance.” The Court explained that a plaintiff’s reliance 
on “indirect proof” is a sufficient basis for plaintiffs’ invocation of the 
presumption, as requiring direct proof “would place an unnecessarily 




 12. Id. at 2407 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 13. Id. at 2408. Courts have generally agreed that the relevant form of the efficient market 
hypothesis is semi-strong form efficiency. See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 273 
F.R.D. 586, 612 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 10 n.16 (1st 
Cir. 2005)) (“The cases agree that finance theory’s hypothesis referred to as ‘semi-strong efficiency’ is 
the closest equivalent to the efficient market relied on by Basic that can be tested.”). In a semi-strong 
form efficient market, information is quickly impounded into a security price such that investors 
cannot earn abnormal profits trading on past information. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient 
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (“[S]emi-strong 
form tests [are those] in which the concern is whether prices efficiently adjust to other information that 
is obviously publicly available.”); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1576 
(1991) (“Semi-strong-form tests: [ ]How quickly do security prices reflect public information 
announcements?”). Semi-strong form efficiency implies that once information is released, it is 
impounded into the stock price going forward; investors cannot earn abnormal profits on average from 
trading on the same past information. Thus, as a matter of economics, plaintiffs would need to show 
that the market for a security was semi-strong form efficient throughout the class period—as opposed 
to generally—in order to rely on a presumption that all investors who purchased throughout purchased 
at a market price impacted by the alleged misrepresentation.  
 14. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414. There is a fourth prerequisite mentioned by the Court—
that “the plaintiff[s] traded the stock between the time the misrepresentations were made and when the 
truth was revealed”—which goes to the definition of the class. Id. at 2408. 
 15. Id. at 2402 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 











So how difficult is it for plaintiffs to show that these three prerequisites 
are satisfied? The answer in many cases is not very. Whether the alleged 
misrepresentation was publicly known (prerequisite 1) is rarely contested. 
As for materiality (prerequisite 2), the Supreme Court in its Amgen 
decision, decided the prior year, held that “[b]ecause the question of 
materiality is common to the class . . . [plaintiffs are] not required to prove 
the materiality of [defendant]’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions 
at the class-certification stage.”16 Instead, the Court held that materiality is 
a merits issue and therefore should be adjudicated only after class 
certification has been granted.
17
 In short, the question of “materiality” is 
not subject to evidentiary challenge by defendants at class certification. 
Finally, while market efficiency (prerequisite 3) is on occasion an 
important contested issue, it is often not. Courts have adopted a number of 
factors, most prominently the well-known Cammer and Krogman factors, 
to assess the efficiency of the market for a security for class certification 
purposes.
18
 These court-adopted factors can often effectively prevent 
defendants from successfully challenging market efficiency for class 
certification purposes even though these court-adopted factors have not 
been shown to provide a reliable test of market efficiency using commonly 
accepted econometric methods in the literature.  
Given all of this, it is not surprising that rebutting the Basic Inc. 
presumption has proven very difficult. Indeed, Justice White, in his 
opinion in Basic Inc., presciently predicted that “rebuttal is virtually 
 
 
 16. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 (2013). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 
F.R.D. 467, 474–78 (N.D. Tex. 2001). In particular, courts have often relied on the five Cammer 
factors in assessing plaintiffs’ claims of market efficiency: (1) average weekly trading volume; 
(2) number of securities analysts following and reporting on a company’s stock; (3) the presence of 
market makers and arbitrageurs; (4) the company’s eligibility to file a Form S-3 Registration 
statement; and (5) a cause-and-effect relationship between corporate disclosures and stock price 
changes. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87. For example, one study documents that of 63 decisions on 
market efficiency between 2002 and 2011, courts ruled in favor of market efficiency in 54 of the 
cases—that is 85% of the time. Elaine Buckberg, Do Courts Count Cammer Factors?, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 23, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/08/23/ 
do-courts-count-cammer-factors/, archived at http://perma.cc/PRN7-CBNG. The same study found 
that courts’ decisions are consistent with a simple counting of Cammer factors. Id. The finance 
literature does not support viewing the first four Cammer factors as formulated and applied as 
constituting a reliable test for establishing semi-strong form market efficiency as they are commonly 
invoked prior to class certification. The fifth Cammer factor (a cause-and-effect relationship between 
public news and changes in stock price) can provide a more reliable indication of market efficiency 
when properly evaluated. However, courts’ understanding of what constitutes a reliable indication can 












impossible in all but the most extraordinary case.”19 Professor Grundfest 
reports that there have been approximately six cases where defendants 
successfully rebutted the Basic Inc. presumption.
20
 To be fair, when 
defendants do challenge market efficiency, they do so in order to challenge 
whether the Basic Inc. presumption applies in the first place, rather than to 
rebut the presumption that an alleged material misrepresentation impacted 
the stock price. Accordingly, solely focusing on successful rebuttals of the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption will overstate the ease with which 
plaintiffs can enjoy the Basic Inc. presumption. Nevertheless, it remains 
true that the fraud-on-the-market presumption has proven enormously 
influential in empowering securities class action litigation in the years 
since Basic Inc. was decided. Consistent with a continuation of this status 
quo, Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence in Halliburton II opined that 
“[t]he Court's judgment, therefore, should impose no heavy toll on 
securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.”21  
But the story does not quite end there. The Halliburton II Court further 
held that defendants can rebut the Basic Inc. fraud-on-the-market 
presumption if defendants introduce “direct evidence” that the alleged 
misrepresentation did not impact the market price even if plaintiffs have 
shown that all three prerequisites (publicity, materiality, and market 
efficiency) are satisfied.
22
 The Court reasoned that since Basic Inc. allows 
plaintiffs to establish price impact via “indirect proof,” defendants should 
be afforded the opportunity to proffer at class certification “more salient 
evidence showing that the alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect 
the stock’s market price and, consequently, that the Basic presumption 
does not apply.”23  
There are at least two important questions left open by the Halliburton 
II Court’s discussion of price impact. What is the difference between 
arguments concerning price impact, which can now be litigated at class 
certification, and arguments concerning “materiality,” which under Amgen 
cannot be litigated at class certification? To put a finer point on the 
question, how can an alleged material misrepresentation in a case 
involving secondary market purchases in an efficient market be “material” 
 
 
 19. Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 20. Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 
BUS. LAW. 307, 360 (2014) (“Cases in which the presumption has been rebutted once it attaches are 
thus as rare as hen’s teeth. There appear to be only six instances . . . .”). 
 21. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 22. Id. at 2415–16. 
 23. Id. at 2416. 











and yet have no price impact associated with that misrepresentation? A 
second and related question is what type of “direct” economic evidence 
suffices to successfully rebut the Basic Inc. presumption? Beyond its 
mention of event studies, the Court did not define or circumscribe the type 
of economic evidence that defendants can proffer as “direct evidence” of a 
lack of price impact. These are both questions, as we will now document, 
that the lower courts have faced in applying Halliburton II.  
III. POST-HALLIBURTON II LOWER COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING PRICE 
IMPACT 
In order to identify how Halliburton II’s price impact inquiry has been 
understood by lower courts in securities matters at class certification, we 
pulled all federal court opinions that cite to Halliburton II. Out of this 
sample, we then identified those cases that address defendants’ attempt to 
rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption at class certification by 
showing a lack of price impact. We identify a total of eight such cases. 
Listed in Figure 1 are the eight cases, the dates of the decisions, and 
whether defendants were successful in rebutting the presumption.  
FIGURE 1. CASES AND DEFENDANTS’ SUCCESS IN REBUTTAL 
Case Docket Number Date Presumption 
Rebutted? 
IBEW v. Best Buy24 
D. Minn 
0:11-cv-00429-DWF-FLN August 6, 2014 No 
McIntire v. China MediaExpress 
S.D. New York 
1:11–cv–00804-VM-GWG  August 15, 2014 No 
Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharmaceutical 
S.D. Florida 
1:13-cv-23878-UU  September 29, 2014 No 
Wallace v. IntraLinks 
S.D. New York 
1:11-cv-08861-TPG, 302 
F.R.D. 310 
September 30, 2014 No 
Local 703 v. Regions Financial 
N.D. Alabama 
2:10-cv-02847-IPJ  November 19, 2014 No 
In re Bridgeport Education 
S.D. California 
13-cv-2947 JM (JLB); 13-
cv-2950 JM (JLB) 
January 15, 2015 No 
Halliburton II on remand 
N.D. Texas 
3:02-cv-01152-M  July 25, 2015 Partially 
In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
S.D. New York  
1:10-cv-03461-PAC  September 24, 2015 No 
 
 
 24. After this Article was written, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court ruling in Best Buy, 
holding that the defendants had established a lack of price impact. IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. 
Best Buy Co., No. 14-3178, 2016 WL 1425807, at *6–7 (8th Cir. 2016). This marks the first case 












Out of the eight securities class certification decisions to date, 
defendants have failed to rebut the presumption in seven. However, in 
Halliburton II itself, on remand from the Supreme Court, the district court, 
in a lengthy analysis of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ price impact arguments, 
found that defendants had successfully shown a lack of price impact for 
five out of the six disclosures at issue.
25
 With respect to one of the 
disclosures, the class was certified.
26
  
There are three general themes that emerge from these decisions. First, 
when addressing confirmatory misrepresentations—alleged 
misrepresentations by a defendant that falsely confirm existing market 
expectations—some courts have concluded that a lack of a change in the 
security’s price at the time of the misrepresentation does not rule out a 
potential price impact associated with the alleged misrepresentation. For 
instance, in McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc.,
27
 defendants 
argued that there was no statistically significant price increase when the 
misrepresentations at issue were made. The court found that this evidence 
was insufficient to rebut the Basic Inc. presumption because a “material 
misstatement can impact a stock’s value . . . by improperly maintaining the 
existing stock price.”28 On a similar note, the court in IBEW Local 98 
Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co.
29
 stated that “[e]ven though the stock price 
may have been inflated prior to the [misrepresentations], the alleged 
misrepresentations could have . . . prolonged the inflation of the 
price . . . .”30 In other words, some courts have reasoned that a lack of a 
statistically significant price reaction as of the misrepresentation date can 
be consistent with there being a potential price impact caused by a 
confirmatory misrepresentation. 
Second, lower courts have reasoned that the identification of non-fraud 
related news that could have caused stock price changes on the 
misrepresentation and corrective disclosure dates (the latter consisting of 
disclosures that reveal to the market the alleged misrepresentation) by 
itself is not sufficient for establishing a lack of price impact. For instance, 
the lower court in IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co. noted that 
there can be price impact “when an unduly optimistic statement stops a 
price from declining (by adding some good news to the mix) . . . .”31 In 
 
 
 25. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 279–80 (N.D. Tex. 2015). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 38 F. Supp. 3d 415, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 28. Id. at 434. 
 29. Civil No. 11–429 (DWF/FLN), 2014 WL 4746195 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2014). 
 30. Id. at *6. 
 31. Id. (quoting Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010)). 











such a situation with countervailing news, a disclosure might not cause a 
statistically significant price reaction even though the statement arguably 
might have a price impact associated with it. 
Third, courts have come to disparate conclusions about the benefit of 
looking at disclosures in addition to the alleged misrepresentation 
disclosures in a price impact analysis. While courts generally have 
considered price changes associated with alleged corrective disclosures 
and certain other disclosures in assessing the price impact of the alleged 
misrepresentations, some courts have nevertheless suggested they will not 
consider certain types of additional disclosures.  In other words, some 
courts have determined that some disclosures and the market reaction to 
them constitute potentially relevant economic evidence on the issue of 
price impact while other disclosures cannot even be considered. For 
instance, some courts have refused to consider disclosures identified by 
defendants that arguably establish that the market already in fact knew the 
truth allegedly being misrepresented and thus the alleged 
misrepresentation (or corrective disclosure thereof) could not have resulted 
in a change in the total mix of information made available to the market 
and, hence, could not have affected the pricing of the security (assuming 
the market were indeed efficient).  
For example, the district court in Halliburton II on remand considered 
in depth various corrective disclosure dates.
32
 On a similar note, the court 
in McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc. examined a disclosure 
prior to the alleged misrepresentation disclosure in the course of 
examining price impact.
33
 At the same time, the court in Aranaz v. 
Catalyst Pharmaceutical Partners Inc.
34
 held that disclosures that speak to 
whether the market knew the truth allegedly being misrepresented cannot 
be considered in assessing price impact. The court in Aranaz reasoned that 
“while the presumption of price impact may be rebutted at the class 
certification stage by directly showing an absence of price impact, it may 
not be indirectly rebutted by showing that the misrepresentation was 
immaterial.”35 As a result of this reasoning, courts have in some instances 
concluded that a lack of a statistically significant price reaction associated 
with the alleged misrepresentation can be consistent with there being a 
 
 
 32. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Tex. 2015). 
 33. 38 F. Supp. 3d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 34. 302 F.R.D. 657, 671 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 













potential price impact even if the truth allegedly being misrepresented had 
arguably been fully disclosed to the market.  
Combined, these eight cases to date suggest that courts have not 
adopted clear or even entirely consistent rules when assessing price impact 
analysis. A lack of statistical significance need not, depending on the facts 
and circumstances, indicate a lack of price impact according to some 
courts. There might have been confounding information or the 
misrepresentation at issue might have been a confirmatory one. Some 
disclosures, such as purported corrective disclosures, can be considered in 
the analysis, while other additional disclosures cannot be so considered.  
IV. THE RELATEDNESS OF THE MATERIALITY AND PRICE IMPACT 
INQUIRIES 
The Supreme Court has clearly drawn a distinction between the 
materiality and price impact inquiries by stating in its Amgen decision that 
the former is an issue of proof at the merits stage while allowing the latter 
to be raised at the class certification stage in its Halliburton II decision.
36
 
But while the existence of a legal distinction is clear, the economic or 
conceptual basis for this distinction is far less clear. 
Start with the legal definition of “materiality.” Information is deemed 
“material,” using the standard TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 
definition, when there is a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the 
[information] would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”37 While TSC Industries, Inc. itself involved the definition of 
materiality for purposes of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 of the Exchange 
Act of 1934, the Court in Basic Inc. adopted the same definition of 
materiality for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. And in its 
Amgen decision, the Court again reaffirmed that this materiality inquiry in 
fraud-on-the-market cases is an objective one based on the “total mix of 
information made available” and the “reasonable investor” standard.38 
As is widely appreciated, in the context of a case in which plaintiffs 
have successfully invoked the Basic Inc. presumption, the “total mix of 
 
 
 36. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
 37. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 
1318 (2011) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988)) (“To prevail on a § 10(b) 
claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made a statement that was ‘misleading as to 
a material fact.’”). 
 38. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 232) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 











information made available” would encompass all publicly available 
information given that any prior disclosed information is already reflected 
in the market price in an efficient market (prerequisite 3 to invoking the 
Basic Inc. presumption). Therefore, only new information that would 
significantly alter what is already publicly available would be deemed 
“material” under TSC Industries, Inc.39 But this materiality definition 
raises the following question: assuming some new information does 
significantly alter what is already known from the publicly available 
information, and hence would thereby be deemed “material,” would not 
that same new information also elicit a change in the market price once 
disclosed given that the market price reflects all publicly available 
information? If it does not elicit such a change, in what sense does the 
information “significantly alter” what is already publicly available? And, 
to finish this line of thought, is not this change in market price the same 
thing as price impact? Defining “total mix of information made available” 
as equivalent to publicly available information in the context of an 
efficient market would therefore appear to collapse the distinction between 
materiality and price impact. 
The same conundrum presents itself if one begins with the notion of 
price impact, rather than materiality. Price impact, according to the 
Halliburton II Court, is the impact of a “material misrepresentation”—a 
misrepresentation that significantly alters the public information already 
incorporated into the security’s price—at the time of the 
misrepresentation.
40
 Price impact then would appear to logically 
accompany a finding (or assumption) of “materiality.”41 And the converse 
would hold true as well. A finding of a lack of “materiality” would imply a 
lack of price impact. That is, the materiality and price impact inquiries 
once again seem to converge. 
Or one can start with equating the concept of the hypothetical 
“reasonable investor” used in the legal definition of “materiality” with the 
hypothetical rational profit-maximizing investor as used in economics. 
The question of “materiality” can then be tackled by asking whether a 
 
 
 39. See TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450. 
 40. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407–08 
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the misrepresentation.  
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hypothetical change in information made available to the market, such as a 
revision to an actual disclosure made or a disclosure of a particular piece 
of information that plaintiffs claim could and should have been made 
earlier, would cause a hypothetical rational profit-maximizing investor to 
change their expectation of the security’s price. If so, then the information 
is “material.” One potential way to answer this question is to ask whether 
an actual change in the total mix of information caused actual investors 
(i.e., the market) to change actual prices. And, of course, measuring actual 
changes in prices in response to changes in the actual information 
available to the market can be analyzed by running an event study with the 
event being the date on which the actual change in the total mix of 
information occurred.
42
 But event studies are also often how an economist 
assesses price impact. Indeed, the Court in the Halliburton II opinion (and 
at the oral argument) focused its attention on event studies as one means of 
measuring price impact.
43
 Thus, from an economic perspective, a common 
method of proof for establishing materiality appears closely related to at 
least one method of proof contemplated by the Halliburton II Court to 
show a lack of price impact. 
Equating the hypothetical reasonable investor with a hypothetical 
rational profit-maximizing investor, which in turn is proxied by the market 
reaction to information in an efficient market, makes some economic and 
legal sense. Undergirding the fraud-on-the-market presumption is the 
assumption, according to the Basic Inc. Court, that the “market is acting as 
the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the 
information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market 
price.”44 In an efficient market—the unpaid agent of the investor—the 
market price is forward-looking, reflecting the market’s estimate of the 
present value of the expected future cash flows given the riskiness of those 
flows.
45
 Security prices change rapidly in an efficient market in response 
to new value-relevant information that alters the total mix of value-
relevant publicly available information. The efficiency of the market 
reflects the fact that actual investors, such as arbitrageurs, incur costs to 
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Whether value-relevant information significantly alters the “total mix 
of information made available” can be addressed by both appealing to 
financial principles as to what should matter to the market as a conceptual 
matter and through event study analysis of whether any actual change in 
the total mix of information can be shown to have actually mattered in 
terms of an observed price change. That is, changes in the actual “total 
mix of information” made publicly available to the market—the issue 
potentially relevant to a TSC Industries, Inc. materiality inquiry—and 
changes in the actual stock prices—the issue potentially relevant to a 
Halliburton II price impact inquiry—therefore appear once again to be 
tightly interconnected in the context of an efficient market.  
As an illustration of these points, consider the following example:  
Example 1: A Simplified Earnings Misrepresentation: Prior to any 
misrepresentation, the market expects a company to earn $0.10 per 
share. The company falsely announces that it earned $0.12 per 
share, but it could and should have reported only $0.10 per share in 
line with market expectations. The associated stock price increase is 
statistically significant. 
In this example, everything works well in terms of assessing materiality 
and price impact through an event study analysis given that: (a) the impact 
of the misrepresentation based on financial principles is expected to be 
value relevant as investors’ reassessment of future expected cash flows 
will increase because higher earnings, all else being equal, typically result 
in more potential cash available to investors; (b) the change in the stock 
price is statistically significant using commonly accepted empirical 
thresholds;
46
 and (c) the actual change in the total mix of information 
made available (earnings surprise of $0.02 per share) equals the 
hypothetical change in the total mix of information caused by the falsity of 
the misrepresentation (again, an earnings surprise of $0.02 per share). 
Given (a)-(c), the event study demonstrates not only that the actual change 
in the total mix of information caused a change in the actual stock price as 
would be expected from financial theory but also that the alleged falsity of 
the misstatement likely caused a change in stock price as would likewise 
be expected from financial theory. That is, the event study demonstrates 
both a price change observed in the actual world (potentially a price 
impact caused by the misrepresentation per se) and a price impact caused 
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by the alleged falsity of the misrepresentation. The event study, for the 
same reasons, likewise supports a finding of materiality. Specifically, the 
event study provides an objective indication that the alleged falsity of the 
misrepresentation caused a significant change in the total mix of 
information because the actual price change observed is statistically 
significant. 
Of course, Example 1 is highly stylized. Conditions (a)-(c) need not 
always hold true. In Example 1, the alleged material misrepresentation 
when made contained information that was expected to be value relevant 
based on financial principles to investors. Economics indicates that not all 
information is necessarily value relevant to investors. Consider the 
following option-backdating example: 
Example 2: A Non-Cash Earnings Misrepresentation: A company 
engages in option backdating in determining stock-based 
compensation for 1QFY01. The option backdating consists of 
falsely representing that stock options were granted at a strike price 
equal to the market price on the date the options were granted. In 
reality, the option’s strike price and grant date were chosen 
retrospectively to conceal the fact that the strike price was below the 
market price on the true grant date (in-the-money options). The 
company’s 1QFY01 quarterly filing discloses to the market the 
actual contractual strike price and the number of options granted, 
albeit not the real grant date. Hence, market participants could 
properly update their assessments of the value of compensation 
awarded based on observable factors. However, because the 
accounting treatment did not follow GAAP at the time, the company 
is later forced to restate the non-cash accounting expense associated 
with granting in-the-money options when the option backdating is 
revealed.  
An important difference of this non-cash earnings misrepresentation 
example from Example 1 is that it is questionable whether one would 
expect, based on financial principles, the market to care about the non-
cash accounting expense associated with granting in-the-money options 
(i.e., whether condition (a) holds true in Example 2). In an efficient 
market, value-relevant information is forward-looking information relating 
to the firm’s future cash flows and/or the appropriate discount rate for 
those cash flows. Only by establishing a connection between the non-cash 
accounting changes and the market’s expectations of future cash flows 
and/or their appropriate discount rates could the new information 
concerning non-cash accounting expenses represent a significant alteration 











in the total mix of value-relevant information in an efficient market. Thus, 
in theory, one might argue that the alleged misrepresentation was unlikely 
to be value relevant and therefore would not be expected to result in any 
hypothetical price impact had the additional information (the real grant 
date) been properly disclosed.  
Be that as it may, some courts have nevertheless found non-cash 
accounting changes, including cases involving companies that engage in 
option-backdating and which trade in an efficient market, to be “material” 
under the TSC Industries, Inc. standard.
47
 Given this legal result, this 
arguably creates a potential legal difference at least in these specific cases 
between “the total mix of information made available” for purposes of the 
materiality inquiry and the “total mix of value relevant information made 
available” that is relevant for purposes of a price impact inquiry. 
Accordingly, cases involving material misrepresentations that are not 
value relevant as a matter of economics could therefore represent potential 
scenarios in which the legal definition of materiality and the economic 
question of price impact could potentially diverge.  
However, this potential distinction between materiality and price 
impact may be less relevant in class action securities cases in which 
plaintiffs invoke the Basic Inc. fraud-on-the-market presumption. The 
Court in Halliburton II emphasized that the presumption of reliance can 
prevail because an alleged material misrepresentation is presumed to have 
impacted price in an efficient market.
48
 Therefore, Halliburton II may 
limit the appropriateness of class treatment to those cases in which the 
alleged material misrepresentations are of the type that one would expect 
to impact price.  
V. ASSESSING PRICE IMPACT WITH AN EVENT STUDY 
In this Part, we will now explore the implications for the materiality 
and price impact inquiries for examples in which either condition (b) or (c) 
does not hold: (b) the change in the stock price is statistically significant 
and (c) the actual change in the total mix of information equals the 
hypothetical change caused by the falsity of the misrepresentation. To do 
so, we assume that the alleged material misrepresentation relates to 
information expected to be value relevant to investors. That is, we assume 
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that condition (a) from Example 1 holds in each of the following examples 
but not necessarily conditions (b) and (c). We will focus first on scenarios 
in which condition (b) does not hold. 
A. Instances in Which Actual Stock Price Changes Are Not Statistically 
Significant 
Generally speaking, a single firm event study identifies abnormal stock 
price changes by comparing the magnitude of actual stock price changes 
observed in the marketplace occurring on a day of interest with a statistical 
measure of the typical magnitude experienced over time.
49
 When the stock 
price changes by an amount deemed to be statistically significant, an 
economist may conclude that the stock price change was outside the 
typical noise and thus potentially related to the release of new information 
to the market at that time.
50
  
However, not all disclosures will lead to actual stock price changes that 
are statistically significant. Instances in which new information is 
disclosed to the market that does not result in a statistically significant 
stock price change can create challenges for an economist conducting 
price-impact studies or for a court evaluating such studies in the class 
certification context. In this section, we provide four examples to explore 
how statistical significance relates to price impact. We also discuss how 
courts have dealt with these situations post-Halliburton II. 
We begin with an example in which the actual change in the total mix 
of information and the degree of the falsity is sufficiently small such that 
the actual change in stock price gets lost in the noise of the market.  
Example 3: An Earnings Misrepresentation “Lost” in the Noise of 
the Market: Prior to any misrepresentation, the market expects a 
company to earn $1.10 per share. The company falsely announces 
that it earned $1.11 per share, but it could and should have reported 
only $1.10 per share in line with market expectations. The 
associated stock price increase is not statistically significant.  
Turning to the three conditions discussed in the context of our earlier 
surprise earnings example, conditions (a) and (c) are satisfied, but not 
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condition (b). As a result, using an event study, one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the stock price reaction is due to random noise. Absent 
reliable statistical evidence of a measurable price change, the event study 
may not be able to distinguish between a random change in stock price 
unrelated to the alleged material misrepresentation and a potential change 
in stock price caused by the alleged material misrepresentation. This 
finding would appear to directly speak to whether the misrepresentation is 
associated with a price impact for purposes of Halliburton II. Importantly, 
the Halliburton II Court stated: 
Suppose a defendant at the certification stage submits an event 
study looking at the impact on the price of its stock from six 
discrete events [and] . . . . one of the six events is the specific 
misrepresentation asserted by the plaintiffs. . . . Now suppose the 
district court determines that, despite the defendant’s study, the 
plaintiff has carried its burden to prove market efficiency, but that 
the evidence shows no price impact with respect to the specific 
misrepresentation challenged in the suit. The evidence at the 
certification stage thus shows an efficient market, on which the 
alleged misrepresentation had no price impact.
51
  
Assuming that Example 3 is akin to the misrepresentation example the 
Halliburton II Court had in mind in this discussion, this would indicate 
that there is no price impact in Example 3. Does such a finding also imply 
there is no “materiality” under TSC Industries, Inc. as a legal matter? Of 
course, it is conceivable that price impacts can be sufficiently small so that 
the misrepresentation is insignificant for both purposes of price impact and 
materiality. But the case law does not indicate that the minimum threshold 
is identical for both inquiries. It is conceivable that the information in 
Example 3 was value relevant information—the earnings surprise of 
$0.01—but fails to elicit a sufficiently large price reaction to be detected 
statistically given the level of background noise in the stock price. Indeed, 
one could go further and argue, appealing to financial principles, that one 
may expect that the information is value relevant to the market even if 
there is no statistical evidence of price impact. Here, the Court has not 
provided much guidance in terms of how to weigh the evidence of a lack 
of price impact based on an event study against alternative analyses. 
Nevertheless, if the analysis of Example 3 is correct and there is no 
price impact under Halliburton II, then a characterization of what the 
 
 












Halliburton II Court was functionally doing is holding that fraud-on-the-
market class action cases need to be based on alleged misrepresentations 
that are “material” in the particular sense that they elicit statistically 
significant price reactions (with, importantly, defendants having the 
burden of showing this not to be the case). That is, if the market acts as the 
“unpaid agent” on behalf of the investor in these cases, as Basic Inc. tells 
us,
52
 then materiality stands or falls on whether the market, the stand-in for 
the “reasonable investor,” can reliably be said to have reacted to the 
information at issue. The Court, for reasons of doctrinal consistency, 
namely its Amgen decision from the prior year,
53
 chose to label this 




If the basis for claiming that the TSC Industries, Inc. materiality 
standard is satisfied rests on considerations other than the market’s 
reaction, then one might argue that these types of cases post-Halliburton II 
should proceed as individual actions rather than be afforded class 
treatment. In our Example 3, the materiality of the alleged 
misrepresentation would be an individualized determination not amenable 
to class treatment under the fraud-on-the-market presumption. In this way, 
the distinction between questions of “materiality” and price impact drawn 
by the Court in Amgen and Halliburton II might represent a way of sorting 
different types of materiality claims depending on their methods of proof. 
Next, we turn to another example where there is a lack of a statistically 
significant price reaction that has come up in multiple forms in the post-
Halliburton II lower court opinions. Specifically, we examine a situation 
in which a company makes a confirmatory misrepresentation. Whereas 
confirmatory misrepresentations are not terms of art in economics, one can 
characterize confirmatory misrepresentations as actionable statements that 
serve to falsely reaffirm market participants’ prior expectations of a 
company’s prospects.55 By way of example, consider the following 
scenario:  
Example 4: An Earnings Misrepresentation that Confirms Prior 
Expectations: Prior to any public statement, the market expects a 
company to earn $0.10 per share. The company falsely announces 
that it earned $0.10 per share in line with market expectations, but 
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plaintiffs allege it could and should have reported only $0.09 per 
share. The associated stock price increase is not statistically 
significant. 
In this example, the confirmatory earnings announcement by the company 
does not alter the actual total mix of information in the marketplace given 
that the announcement exactly matches the market’s expectations. Given 
these facts, one would not expect a stock price change at the time the 
misrepresentation is made if the market were indeed efficient. From the 
market’s perspective, there has been no change in the actual information 
available to the market as a result of the earnings misrepresentation. 
However, one could argue that there would have been a hypothetical 
change in the total mix of information if the firm had hypothetically told 
the truth by announcing a negative earnings surprise of one cent per share. 
Accepting this framing of the “but for” world—the world that would have 
existed if the firm had not engaged in the alleged misconduct—there arises 
an important distinction between the hypothetical change in the total mix 
of information and the actual change in the total mix. An event study 
analysis of the announcement can only assess whether there is a reliable 
indication of an actual change in stock price that resulted from an actual 
change in the total mix of information.  
To understand whether an unobserved, hypothetical change in the total 
mix of information would have resulted in a price impact may well require 
additional analysis. For example, in certain circumstances, an economist 
may be able to learn about the potential for a price impact caused by the 
alleged confirmatory misrepresentation by examining other disclosures 
and their associated price changes. This additional analysis can be 
informative, but does have some pitfalls as we will point out.  
Turning back to Example 4, suppose that the earnings 
misrepresentation identified by the plaintiffs is on the date of the firm’s 
SEC filing. Further suppose that the company had pre-announced its 
earnings at an earlier date. Given the claim of market efficiency 
(prerequisite 3), the price impact of the earnings misrepresentation in the 
SEC filing could potentially be assessed by examining the actual change in 
stock price associated with the earlier pre-announcement. 
Whether analyses of additional disclosures in Example 4 would be 
informative as to the price impact of the alleged earnings 
misrepresentation in the SEC filing could depend on, among other things, 
whether the total mix of information remained relatively stable over time. 
For example, if the company experienced significant operational changes 












differences in the way investors value otherwise seemingly identical 
information. If so, the changed circumstance could limit the applicability 
of the additional analyses. That said, analyses of disclosures and stock 
price movements on days other than an alleged confirmatory 
misrepresentation comport with commonly accepted practices and can be 
informative.  
Consistent with this reasoning, post-Halliburton II decisions have 
looked at the price impact associated with other disclosures. Specifically, 
in McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc.,
56
 plaintiffs alleged that 
there were various misrepresentations in an audit opinion concerning a 
firm’s financials that misled the market. Defendants argued that since 
there was no price reaction associated with the disclosure of the audit 
opinion, there was no price impact under Halliburton II.
57
  Rejecting this 
argument, the court noted that “days before [defendant] issued its audit 
opinion, [the] stock price increased based on its release of unaudited 
financial statements.”58 Therefore, the actual audit opinion could 
reasonably be viewed, according to the court, as confirming the earlier 
unaudited financial statements which did elicit a price reaction.
59
  
Not surprisingly, so-called corrective disclosures—disclosures that 
revealed the misrepresentation to the market—have been a common focal 
point of analysis in post-Halliburton II price impact cases. For instance, 
the district court’s opinion in Halliburton II on remand focused significant 




While courts post-Halliburton II have clearly shown a willingness to 
consider additional disclosures in assessing the price impact of a 
misrepresentation—a willingness that is consistent with considering all the 
economic evidence that might be brought to bear on the issue—some 
courts also have refused at times to allow such an analysis with respect to 
certain disclosures. For example, the court in Aranaz stated: 
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Defendants attempt to rebut the presumption of reliance by showing 
that the alleged misrepresentation had no impact on the price of 
Catalyst common stock. In support of this contention, Defendants 
rely largely on the argument that the truth . . . was already known to 
the public and that the alleged misrepresentation therefore could not 
have impacted the price of Catalyst common stock.
61
  
The court refused to consider this argument, which if correct would have 
indicated a lack of price impact in an efficient market. According to the 
court, defendant’s argument was really about materiality, an issue the 
Amgen Court said cannot be considered at the class certification stage.
62
 
These arguments, labeled as “truth-on-the-market” defenses, have been 
rejected by some other post-Halliburton II courts at the class certification 
stage as well.
63
 The confusion by courts is understandable given the lack 
of instruction provided in Halliburton II and its relationship to Amgen. 
However, a decision to look at just a subset of disclosures in assessing 
price impact is inconsistent with considering all the relevant economic 
evidence.
64
 If a disclosure reveals that the market knew the truth, despite 
the alleged misrepresentation, then that should be considered in the course 
of assessing price impact just as other disclosures, such as corrective 
disclosures, are currently considered.  
There is one final interesting wrinkle in Example 4. There is an 
alternative understanding of the hypothetical change in the total mix of 
information due to the alleged fraud. Suppose in Example 4 that the firm 
did not have a legal duty to disclose earnings per share at the time that it 
did, but nevertheless chose to make the misrepresentation. As Professor 
Langevoort has discussed, the “but for” world in which the firm did not 
engage in fraud could simply be a world in which the firm remained silent 
rather than disclose the true earnings per share.
65
 This formulation of the 
hypothetical change in the total mix of information is motivated by Basic 
Inc.’s famous statement that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not 
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misleading under Rule 10b–5.”66 Indeed, in Basic Inc. itself, the Court 
explained that an appropriate course of action for the firm was to issue a 
“no comment” statement, rather than make misleading statements about 
the status of merger negotiations.
67
 If the market would have continued to 
believe in Example 4 that earnings would be $0.10 per share if the firm 
had hypothetically remained silent (or issued a “no comment” statement), 
then the actual change in the total mix of information is in fact the same as 
the hypothetical change in the total mix of information (i.e., zero). With 
this definition of the “but for” world, there would be no price impact 
associated with the misrepresentation.  
This discussion of what constitutes the hypothetical change in the total 
mix of information raises an important point. Namely, the inquiry into 
price impact might well be dependent upon plaintiffs’ allegations, in 
particular plaintiffs’ position on what a company could and should have 
said at the time of the alleged misrepresentation. In order to test whether 
there is price impact associated with an alleged misstatement, it is not 
always sufficient to know which statements are alleged to be false and 
misleading. Rather, it can be important to know what the plaintiffs’ theory 
is as to what could and should have been disclosed instead in order to 
understand the hypothetical change in the total mix of information. After 
all, the price impact inquiry at issue may relate to the price impact caused 
by the alleged falsity of the misrepresentation and not just the fact that a 
misrepresentation was made. 
Consider another example that further highlights the potentially 
important distinction between hypothetical and actual changes in the total 
mix of information.  
Example 5: Collateral consequences: A company falsely states that 
it is not engaged in option backdating. When it is revealed that the 
company was involved in option backdating, there is no statistically 
significant stock price reaction. Later, the SEC decides to 
investigate. At this point, the market becomes concerned that the 
company’s visionary leader will be forced to resign and the stock 
price falls by a statistically significant amount (using thresholds 
commonly applied in peer-reviewed journals).  
If the hypothetical change in the total mix of information that could and 
should have occurred is the revelation of the option backdating, then an 
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event study may support a finding of no price impact given the market’s 
non-reaction to the actual disclosure of option backdating. However, if the 
claim is that there could and should have been disclosures that relate to the 
risk, perhaps modest, that the company’s leader will be implicated 
(assuming such a claim is legally cognizable), then the analysis becomes 
more involved.  
In this more complicated setting, a number of additional issues may 
present themselves in exploring the hypothetical change in the total mix of 
information and any associated potential price impact. For example, does 
the revelation of the option backdating itself constitute revelation of the 
allegedly previously undisclosed risk of some chance of managerial 
turnover? Also, what would the market’s assessment of the likelihood of 
an SEC investigation, and any associated market concerns over the risk of 
managerial turnover, have been if the option backdating had been 
disclosed at an earlier period of time? These questions often relate to 
questions involving what if as opposed to what happened. A typical event 
study may not be well suited to address these types of “what if” questions 
absent other reliable economic analysis.  
Next, we turn to another example that has also come up in the recent 
post-Halliburton II court rulings mentioned earlier. Consider a scenario in 
which a company makes a misstatement that surprises the market (as 
opposed to a confirmatory misrepresentation) on the same day that it 
releases non-fraud-related confounding information.  
Example 6: A Simplified Earnings Misrepresentation with 
Confounding Information: Prior to any misrepresentation, the 
market expects a company to earn $0.10 per share. The company 
falsely announces that it earned $0.11 per share, but it could and 
should have reported only $0.10 per share in line with market 
expectations. The company also announces for the first time 
guidance for the coming year that is lower than the market’s prior 
expectations for reasons unrelated to its earnings estimate. The 
associated stock price increase is not statistically significant.  
This example complicates Example 1 by introducing negative 
confounding information—that is, the company simultaneously announces 
lower guidance than expected. Absent the negative confounding 
information, economic theory indicates that the stock price would be 
expected to increase, all else equal. However, all else is not equal because 
the positive news associated with the alleged misrepresentation is 












In Example 6, one can see a potential limitation of single firm event 
studies. Namely, single firm events, as typically employed in litigation, 
examine the change in actual stock prices associated with the actual 
changes in the total mix of information. When the actual change in the 
total mix of information contains separate pieces of information, the event 
study as commonly employed may not be able to disentangle the cause, if 
any, of the change in stock price.
68
  
Courts examining the post-class certification, merits phase of securities 
litigation are well versed in this issue. For example, in assessing loss 
causation, courts have had to adjudicate matters in which an alleged 
corrective disclosure contained both negative fraud-related and non-fraud-
related information.
69
  In some instances, prior courts have determined that 
plaintiffs bore the burden of demonstrating that the non-fraud related 
information did not substantially cause the observed price declines 
measured via the event study.
70
 In the price impact context, some court 
rulings post-Halliburton II to date suggest that courts have required a 
similar hurdle for defendants. For instance, the court in Wallace v. 
IntraLinks
71
 rejected defendants’ price impact argument by concluding 
that the defendants had not identified factors unrelated to the fraud that 
“exclusively caused” the stock price drop on an alleged corrective 
disclosure date. That is, the court held that defendants did not prove that 
the entire price drop was caused by the release of non-fraud information 
and, as such, did not prove that the price drop actually observed was not 
caused at least in part by revelation of the alleged misrepresentations at 
issue.
72
   
 
 
 68. Economists can alter the formulation of their event study to address instances in which 
multiple pieces of information are released on a given day. For the purposes of this discussion, we 
assume that the event study in question relies on daily closing prices. 
 69. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 392 (9th Cir. 2010) (addressing 
whether purported corrective disclosure price reaction was due to revelation of the alleged fraud or 
non-fraud factors). 
 70. See, e.g., Gould v. Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F.3d 148, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2012). 
Interestingly, this may be a mirror image of the issues typically facing plaintiffs in proving loss 
causation. For example, some courts have required plaintiffs to parse between confounding firm-
specific news and the fraud-related news to prove loss causation at summary judgment. See, e.g., In re 
Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir. 2009).  
 71. 302 F.R.D. 310, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 72.  Id. 











B. Actual Change in the Total Mix of Information Does Not Equal the 
Degree of Alleged Falsity 
Our examples so far have not directly addressed the following 
situation: instances in which the actual change in the total mix of 
information does not equal the degree of alleged falsity. We will explore 
this issue in this section by examining the potential distinction between the 
price impact of an alleged misrepresentation and the price impact of the 
falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. Exploring this difference is useful 
as it provides an additional lens through which to better understand the 
type of economic evidence that may be relevant to price impact and the 
distinction the Supreme Court drew between the price impact inquiry 
contemplated by Halliburton II and the forbidden materiality inquiry of 
Amgen. This discussion will also serve to further highlight the relationship 
between pleading standards placed on plaintiffs and defendants’ 
Halliburton II price impact burden.  
We will motivate our discussion again through the use of an example. 
Example 7: A Small Earnings Misrepresentation Relative to the 
Actual Surprise: Prior to any misrepresentation, the market expects 
a company to earn $0.10 per share. The company announces it 
earned $0.11 per share, but it could and should have reported only 
$0.10 per share given that its actual per share earnings was $0.104. 
In other words, the company should have rounded down to $0.10 
per share rather than up to $0.11. The associated stock price 
increase is statistically significant.  
Importantly, in this example, the falsity of the statement lies in the fact 
that the company was treating earnings per share as if they were $0.001 
higher than they really were, thereby resulting in the improper rounding 
up. However, the actual change in the total mix of information made 
available as a result of the corporate statement is a $0.01 per share 
surprise. That is, there is a mismatch between the actual change of $0.01 
and the hypothetical change of $0.001 relating to the improper rounding 
treatment of the earnings per share.  
This example demonstrates that there can be an important distinction 
between measuring the price impact of a statement that is false and 
measuring the price impact of the falsity itself. Event studies can only 
directly measure the price impact of statements, rather than the price 
impact of the aspect of the statement that is false. That is, the event study 
in this hypothetical example assesses whether there was a price impact 












change of $0.001 relating to the improper rounding treatment of the 
earnings per share. Even if an event study evidences the existence of an 
actual change in stock price caused by an actual change in the total mix of 
information, as in this example, the same study may not provide reliable 
evidence that some portion of the actual stock price change resulted from 
the assumed hypothetical change in the total mix of information due to the 
alleged fraud.  
This type of scenario could lead to difficulties for defendants, 
depending upon how subsequent courts view the burden of proof. For 
example, if courts focus the inquiry on whether the stock price moved as a 
result of the actual change in the total mix of information, event studies 
could be conducted to address this issue. Alternatively, if courts deem that 
the price impact inquiry relates to a change in price caused by the alleged 
falsity at issue, then defendants’ ability to rebut using an event study (as 
arguably envisioned by the Court in Halliburton II) could be limited to 
only those types of statements in which the actual change in the total mix 
of information equals the hypothetical change in the total mix of 
information given plaintiffs’ allegations, such as in our Example 1. 
Defendants also could appeal to alternative methods to assess price 
impact, and doing so may require courts to impose more rigorous pleading 
standards on plaintiffs so as to identify precisely the alleged falsity of the 
misrepresentations at issue.  
Of course, questions relating to how courts will evaluate the burden of 
proof relating to price impact inquiries will not always favor plaintiffs. For 
example, consider an alternative scenario. 
Example 8: A Small Earnings Misrepresentation Relative to the 
Actual Surprise with Confounding Information: Prior to any 
misrepresentation, the market expects the company to earn $0.10 
per share. The company announces it earned $0.11 per share by 
again improperly rounding up from $0.104, but lowers guidance 
going forward. Plaintiffs allege that the company could and should 
have reported $0.10 per share instead of $0.11. The associated stock 
price increase is not statistically significant.  
Here, as in Example 7, the alleged falsity relates to a $0.001 hypothetical 
change in the total mix of information, but with a complication—
confounding information in the form of an announcement of lower 
guidance. Unlike the prior example, defendants may argue that there is no 
price impact associated with the company’s actual statements taken as a 
whole. We say “as a whole” because typical daily single firm event studies 
evaluate changes in security prices resulting from any and all changes in 











the total mix of information, not just single statements alleged by plaintiffs 
to be false. Moreover, building on the empirical finding of no price impact 
related to the actual change in the total mix of information, the defendants 
also might have an argument that the alleged falsity—treating earnings as 
if they were $0.001 per share higher—would not be expected to elicit a 
statistically meaningful stock price reaction based on financial principles. 
The success of this argument may depend on whether the relevant legal 
issue is the price impact of an alleged misrepresentation or the price 
impact of the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. The latter framing of 
the price impact inquiry appears more consistent with testing the 
applicability of the “fundamental premise” according to the Halliburton II 
Court of the Basic Inc. presumption, whether the fraud mislead the market 
and caused the stock price to be distorted. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE IMPACT OF HALLIBURTON II GOING 
FORWARD  
We conclude by offering some thoughts on the likely impact of 
Halliburton II on the ability of plaintiffs to obtain class certification in 
most cases. Our first observation on the likely impact of Halliburton II 
begins with the fact that even assuming that defendants could defeat or 
limit class certification based on a showing of no price impact a significant 
percentage of the time, plaintiffs could potentially recast their claims as 
omissions claims. For omissions claims, plaintiffs seeking class 
certification may not need to rely on the Basic Inc. presumption for class 
certification, but rather may invoke the presumption found in Affiliated 
Ute Citizens v. United States.
73
 Since the showing of no price impact 
rebuts the Basic Inc. presumption, such a showing would simply not be 
relevant if plaintiffs proceeded under Affiliated Ute. Indeed, prior to 
Halliburton II, plaintiffs invoked the Affiliated Ute presumption 
approximately 1% of the time in class action complaints.
74
 During the 
pendency of the Halliburton II decision, plaintiffs invoked the Affiliated 
Ute presumption 38% of the time, but after the Halliburton II decision, 
that number increased to 52%.
75
 Of course, this is not to suggest that 
 
 
 73. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Under Affiliated Ute, investors are entitled to a presumption of reliance 
(with no showing of market efficiency) if the allegations involve omissions. Id. at 153; see also 
Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 5, at 689.  
 74. RENZO COMOLLI & SVETLANA STARYKH, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: 2014 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 7 (2015), available at http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/ 
publications/2015/PUB_Full_Year_Trends_2014_0115.pdf. 












plaintiffs can always readily transform misrepresentation claims into 
omissions claims. Indeed, in omissions cases, plaintiffs may well need to 




Putting aside the availability of Affiliated Ute, we conclude that 
ultimately the impact of Halliburton II will largely depend on how 
subsequent courts understand the price impact inquiry and how they 
determine to evaluate the burden of proof associated with that 
interpretation. In particular, subsequent courts will likely need to better 
define whether the price impact inquiry relates specifically to the falsity of 
the alleged misrepresentation or the existence of the misrepresentation 
itself. To the extent the price impact inquiry turns on the falsity of the 
alleged misrepresentation, pleading standards should reflect the need for 
plaintiffs to clearly identify what could and should have been said as 
opposed to simply identifying a false statement. Currently, different courts 
are not uniform in their approach to this issue.  
The impact of Halliburton II will also depend on how courts go about 
examining the price impact at the time of the alleged misrepresentation 
and at the time of the alleged corrective disclosure. Of particular interest in 
this regard is the Regions Financial decision.
77
 This case involved 
allegations that Regions misrepresented the value of its assets and its 
financial stability.
78
 The purported corrective disclosure consisted of a 
disclosure of a “$6 billion non-cash charge for impairment of goodwill.”79 
Defendants argued that there was no statistically significant price reaction 
on any of the thirteen misrepresentation dates and that the price decline on 
the date of the corrective disclosure was not statistically significant.
80
 
Notably, the court, in rejecting defendants’ price impact argument, did not 
reject the findings of no statistical significance for any of the 
misrepresentations and corrective disclosure dates.
81
 It simply held that 
whether the stock price drop was due to overall market conditions is 
 
 
 76. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988). 
 77. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV–
10–J–2847–S, 2014 WL 6661918 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014). 
 78.  Id. at *2. The court stated, “According to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, Regions made a 
series of misrepresentations beginning in 2008, about the value of its assets and its financial stability. 
More specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Regions—which was heavily invested in the real estate 
market—manipulated the way unhealthy assets were carried on its books to avoid disclosing 
significant losses that would compromise the company’s value.” Id. (quoting Local 703, I.B. of T. 
Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
 79. Id. at *7. 
 80. Id. at *6. 
 81. Id. at *8 











properly reserved for the jury.
82
 As the court explained, “[w]hether this 
tumble was due to defendants’ corrective disclosures . . . or due to the 
overall market conditions on that day, is . . . properly reserved for a jury to 
decide.”83 The court cited as affirmative “evidence of price impact” the 
non-cash accounting corrective disclosure and that it was mentioned in 
analysts’ reports, even though this evidence related to a potential price 
impact at the time of the corrective disclosure and not necessarily at the 
time of the alleged misstatement.
84
  
Finally, even with these questions resolved, courts will face challenges 
assessing the economic evidence amassed by the parties. Given a properly 
conducted event study, courts may have to determine whether a lack of a 
statistically significant stock price change observed in the actual world 
implies a price impact in the hypothetical world, and vice versa. And 
courts will need to determine in a consistent way which set of disclosures, 
in addition to the misrepresentation disclosure itself, can be considered in 
the course of assessing price impact. 
While the Halliburton II Court seemed to think that event studies 
would be a relatively straightforward way of sorting securities class 
actions at the class certification stage, the complexities of actual practice 
might turn out quite differently.  
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